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Measuring liquidity under stress
Christian Upper, Deutsche Bundesbank
In my contribution to the panel, I want to focus on how to measure liquidity under stress. Since
financial markets seem to behave quite differently in periods of stress than under normal conditions,
measures of liquidity that tend to work well most of the time may no longer be meaningful in turbulent
markets.
In line with much of the literature, I define market liquidity as the “ease” with which a security can be
traded. The word “ease” can be substituted by the word “cost”. The cost of trading includes
commissions, fees and taxes as well as the bid-ask spread, the price impact of a trade, and the cost
caused by prices movements if a trade cannot be executed at once or when it is split up into a
sequence of smaller transactions. In normal times, the cost of trading is particular relevant for those
investors who try to make a profit by trading on small movements in prices and, consequently, turn
over positions relatively quickly. For such agents, even small differences in the cost of a transaction
can make or break a trading strategy. Investors with longer time horizons shouldn’t really worry about
market liquidity.
In periods of stress, the relative importance of the individual factors determining market liquidity
changes. Prices become much more volatile than they are normally, and a strong desire on part of the
traders to close undesired positions seems to dominate all other motivations for trading. From
conversations with practitioners, I have the impression that costs arising from the price impact of
trades or the inability to close positions quickly when prices are moving against them tend to eclipse
the bid-ask spread and administrative costs. As a consequence, any measure for liquidity under stress
should meet two requirements:
1. it should reflect the costs of closing large positions quickly; and
2. it should be available at a relatively high frequency as even relatively brief bouts of illiquidity
may impose heavy costs on market participants if prices are volatile.
In order to illustrate the issues involved, I consider the liquidity of 10 year German government bonds
market during two episodes of stress. The first took place in the aftermath of the Russian debt
moratorium on 17 August, and the second during the sharp revaluation of the yen vis-à-vis the US
dollar on 8 and 9 October of the same year.
1 As you will find out, the microstructure of the German
bond market is broadly similar to that of foreign exchange markets, so the discussion should have
some relevance beyond the particular market segment considered.
Although German government bonds are listed, the role of exchanges is negligible, with the bulk of
trading taking place over the counter. This is especially true for the inter-dealer market, where trading
takes place either directly between banks or through inter-dealer brokers (Freimakler). These act as
intermediaries, but have no obligation to provide firm quotes. More recently, a sizeable proportion of
inter-dealer trading has shifted to the electronic trading systems Euro-MTS, but electronig trading did
not exist in 1998. The OTC market seems to be altogether rather opaque. Participants observe quotes
but do not receive timely information on other traders’ past transactions beyond anecdotal evidence.
The only comprehensive data set is maintained by the German securities regulator, which receives
information on every single transaction in Germany, regardless of whether or not it takes place on an
exchange. However, this data is not published on a regular basis  - not even in aggregated form -
although it has been available for research purposes.
After this brief excursion into the microstructure of the German government bond market, let me turn to
our main topic. A measure for liquidity that is often used by practitioners is trading volume. As a
macroeconomist raised on representative agent models, where markets can be liquid without any
trades actually taking place, I initially found this surprising. Market liquidity is only one, and not
necessarily the most important, factor affecting trading activity. For example, if traders have sufficiently
large hedging needs, then they may trade even if market liquidity is relatively low. What volume does
tell us, however, is whether trading was possible at all.
1
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Turnover in the German government bond market was particularly high just after the Russian debt
moratorium, with a high average size of trade. Both turnover and the average trade size declined
throughout September, and remained relatively - but not unusually - low on 8
 and 9 October. Should
we conclude that the market was very liquid during the first episode but not during the second? Not
necessarily. Perhaps market participants had much stronger hedging needs after the Russian
moratorium than during the events in the forex market.
A measure for liquidity that is easily available at any frequency and is directly linked to the cost of
trading is the quoted bid-ask spread. However, since there is no commitment to market making in the
OTC market for Bundesanleihen, quoted spreads are merely indicative, ie agents do not have to
honour the prices they promise. While this should not matter in normal times, it is a problem in periods
of stress. Traders told me that in the aftermath of the Russian moratorium, some traders simply did not
bother to answer the phone. In addition, quoted spreads apply to transactions up to a specified
amount only, which, furthermore, may vary over time. Eg if market participants cut this amount in
periods of stress, then this would leave the quoted spread unchanged, even though market depth
would fall.
One way out is to compute effective spreads from transactions data.
2 Unlike quoted spreads, effective
spreads refer to the average transaction and therefore capture at least some of the cost of closing
large positions. Unfortunately, this comes at a cost. Effective spreads have to be estimated, which
introduces noise and reduces the frequency at which they are available. For the four German
government bonds of our sample, the highest frequency which could be computed was one day.
Figure 2 shows the effective bid-ask spreads computed with Roll’s (1984) measure. While this
measure has important shortcomings
3, it is easy to estimate and does require a direction of trade
indicator (which I have not been able to construct). I find that effective bid-ask spreads rose from
values of less than one basis point during the first, tranquil, half of the year to 2-2½ basis points during
the second half of August. This clearly indicates a reduction in market liquidity, in contrast to the
increase suggested by the turnover series. Effective spreads gradually declined until the beginning of
October, but soared to to around 4 basis points on 8 and 9 October.
How can we interpret the apparently contradictory findings of the activity series and the bid-ask
spreads? First of all, the two measures should be viewed in conjunction. The increase in spreads after
the Russian moratorium looks less menacing if we bear in mind that the market has been able to
handle a considerably higher volume as well as larger trade sizes than under normal conditions. In
early October, in contrast, there was no surge in volume which could explain at least part of the
widening of the bid-ask spreads, which therefore looks much more threatening.
Let me conclude by restating the two requirements that a measure for liquidity under stress should
meet. Firstly, it should reflect the cost of closing large positions within a short period of time. Secondly,
it should be available at high frequencies. Neither trading volume nor the effective bid-ask spread
considered completely satisfy both requirements on their own. Taken together, however, we do get a
fair picture of a market that seems to have been rather effective in handling a high degree of activity in
August but became rather illiquid in October.
The ascent of electronic trading should - in principle - open up new sources of high quality data, which
would permit us to compute more elaborate measures of liquidity. It is crucial, though, that central
banks actually get access to this data. The experience in this respect has so far not been very
encouraging.
2
For a survey of different ways to compute effective spreads refer to Huang & Stoll (1997).
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In particular, the Roll-measure is biased downwards in the presence of asymmetric information or inventory effects. Since
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